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Nancy Holman, Andy Thornley 
Backlash in the London suburbs: the lo-
cal/strategic tension in multi-level govern-
ance  
Abstract: In this article we explore the tensions in metropolitan level governance between strategic planning 
and desires for political decentralisation.  We do this through a three-part analysis. First we focus on the 2008 
election strategy of Boris Johnson to become Mayor of London, with its aim of gaining suburban votes and giv-
ing more autonomy to the local Borough level. We then look at the impacts of this campaign on electoral results 
and, finally, the outcome of the Outer London Commission, which was set up by the Mayor after the election to 
deal with strategic issues concerning London’s suburbs.  We find that a strategic intent to benefit suburban 
residents and the decentralisation of power to the Boroughs, are contradictory and have led to a policy stale-
mate. 
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1 Introduction 
The focus of our attention in this article is the relationship between metropolitan and local gov-
ernment in London. We show how this underwent a significant change around the Mayoral elec-
tion of 2008.  Since the advent of globalization the politics of world cities such as London has 
been dominated by the desire to ensure economic competitiveness. Increasing social polarisa-
tion in world cities, with its potential for social unrest, has also been widely acknowledged.  The 
political response has tried to formulate policies to address both international business priori-
ties and the needs of deprived areas. Our purpose here is to show that in London there has been 
the rise of a third dimension in the political mix. There has been an awakening of the usually 
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politically dormant suburban areas. Cities as big as London cannot be governed by a single polit-
ical entity and a division of responsibilities between metropolitan and local authorities is inevi-
table. However the relationship between these levels can vary both between cities and over 
time.  The increase in the salience of suburban politics has created questions for this metropoli-
tan/local relationship in London.  
Boris Johnson won the London Mayoral election in 2008 having fought a campaign to raise his 
political profile in London’s ‘neglected’ suburbs, and we will show how their support was pivot-
al in his victory.  His election manifesto promised to reduce the influence of the Mayor and give 
more autonomy of policymaking to the local level. This was a response to the strongly held de-
sire expressed by local suburban communities for less Mayoral imposition, especially on hous-
ing policy.  The result of this approach was to potentially reduce the ability of the Mayor to pur-
sue metropolitan-wide policymaking and fulfil his strategic leadership role. After his election 
Johnson wanted to use his position to benefit suburban areas and he set up the Outer London 
Commission in 2009 to explore possible policies. This Commission, which was made up of rep-
resentatives of the Boroughs, business, the development industry and the voluntary sector was 
charged with developing a new direction that responded to the perceived needs of the Outer 
London economy.  In the final part of the article we will review the experience of this Commis-
sion. We use it to illustrate two complications that arose from the entry of suburban politics and 
the shift in the balance of power towards the local level. One is that the promise to reduce 
Mayoral authority over the local level does not sit easily with the Mayor’s desire to use his stra-
tegic role to benefit suburban areas. The second is that the suburban areas may have a common 
interest in gaining more autonomy, and freeing themselves from certain metropolitan-wide 
policies, but they find it difficult to agree on beneficial positive policies.   
So we start our analysis with a discussion of multi-level government before turning to the way 
this has evolved in the London case. As many authors have pointed out it is important to take on 
board the issues of ‘path dependency’ and the specific political and institutional conditions that 
apply in a particular city (Cox, 2011; Keil, 2011; Gordon et al 2012). We then review how the 
metropolitan/local relationship was operating between the establishment of the Greater Lon-
don Authority in 2000 and Johnson’s election in 2008. It is necessary to do this in order to back 
up our argument that this election was the harbinger of a significant shift. We then present a 
detailed analysis of the 2008 election through examining the manifesto of Boris Johnson and the 
electoral results. We then turn our attention to the some of the policy difficulties resulting from 
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the new political landscape that prioritises the suburbs. In this section we use the experience of 
Outer London Commission as an illustration of these difficulties.   However first of all we need to 
be more specific about our definition of ‘suburban’ given the particularity of London’s political 
geography.  
2 Suburban London 
As discussed in other contributions to this special issue there has been a trend for cities to ex-
pand into their periphery, and many new urban forms such as polycentric cities or edge cities, 
have been identified. Much of this literature stems from the US experience where sprawl, the 
development of fragmented jurisdictions, and post-suburban politics are central issues (Phelps 
& Wood 2011; Phelps et al 2010; for a comparative perspective see Phelps and Wu 2011).  
However London is very different largely due to the stronger interventionist role played by the 
state.  In discussing the literature on suburbia in relation to London the impact of one important 
urban policy needs to be kept in mind – namely the Green Belt (Cochrane, 2011).  This policy, 
imposed by national legislation in 1955, has been consistently and vigorously applied.  Although 
there has been constant debate over its value and impact, it is still in force. Thus a belt of land 
approximately three miles wide surrounds the city in which development cannot take place.  
The orbital motorway, the M25, travels round this Green Belt.  
 This land on the edge of the built up area and containing the motorway junctions would be the 
natural location for edge city development.  However it is not possible to find such development 
in London and the pressure is deflected either inward to any available land or outwards beyond 
the Green Belt.  This latter area has experience considerable growth in recent decades. Major 
developments have occurred around existing cities such as Reading or Cambridge, or in the 
form of planned developments such as Milton Keynes or the emerging Ebbsfleet/Bluewater 
complex.  The inward pressure places increased importance on any land that becomes available 
within the Green Belt such as brown field sites.  Key examples of this kind are London Dock-
lands and the Olympic Park.  
However the spatial focus of our study here is the outer edge of the metropolitan area – the built 
up area that abuts the inside of the Green Belt. Institutionally this ring roughly equates to the 
Outer Boroughs (see fig.1). People began to move out of inner London in the early twentieth 
century with the increasing access provided by new public transport. London Underground 
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undertook propaganda campaigns to encourage the middle classes to relocate to the new es-
tates being built around the more distant tube stations. This was facilitated by the rise of the 
Building Societies who offered loans for house purchase. This process established a broad dis-
tinction between inner and outer London based on income and house tenure. The outer area, 
labelled the ‘suburbs’ continued to grow to satisfy housing demand during the interwar and 
post war decades. By the 1970s most land between the inner area and the Green Belt that was 
not protected by environmental policies had been developed.  
This outward growth of London led to governmental reforms. The London County Council 
(LCC), set up in 1888, no longer represented the metropolitan area. The Greater London Council 
was formed in 1965 to extend the coverage right out to the Green Belt involving the incorpora-
tion of the outer suburbs. Within this metropolitan level 32 local authorities, the London Bor-
oughs, were formed alongside the City of London Corporation. Historically the Outer Boroughs 
have been seen as politically ‘conservative’ and primarily concerned to safeguard their existing 
advantageous life style. As Cox (2011) notes the political priority of outer suburbs generally is 
oriented to issues of consumption and the creation of desirable living places. In London the Out-
er Boroughs in the past usually pursued protectionist policies and preferred to detach them-
selves from metropolitan-wide policies – at times directly opposing them. For example when 
the GLC adopted its ‘fares fair policy’ to cut bus and tube fares by 25%, the Borough of Bromley 
successfully took the GLC to court to stop the policy as they did not believe that their residents 
would benefit.  
INSERT FIGURE ONE HERE 
However within this general pattern there is some variety. For example the Borough of Croydon 
took advantage of the 1960s national policy to ban office development in central London to de-
velop a major office and retail centre that could be described as a complete town centre rather 
than a suburb.  In more recent years further changes have taken place that have added to the 
suburban variety. For example immigrant communities have moved to some parts of outer Lon-
don generating more mixed communities and, often, political tensions (Mace 2013).  As Mac-
Leod and Jones (2011) point out ‘suburbs are diversifying quickly and can no longer be easily 
catalogued as bastions of White middle-class uniformity offering refuge from inner-city blight’ 
(p. 2462). While some suburbs remain prosperous others are experiencing increasing economic 
problems with the withdrawal of investment from employment activity and local high streets. 
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Increasingly these outer suburbs are expressing a feeling of ‘neglect’. This has led to more polit-
ical involvement and a new scenario for metropolitan/local relations. We will return later to the 
increasing variety amongst the Outer Boroughs and the implications for any concerted policy 
for suburbia that might address such problems.  
2.1 Multi-level governmental relations 
In recent years the issue of the power relationship between levels of government has attracted 
considerable attention in urban politics literature (e.g. Sellers, 2002 & 2005; Peters & Pierre, 
2001). There have been a number of strands to this.  A major one has been the discussion of the 
changing relationship between nation states and cities. There has been a trend for unitary states 
to decentralise creating greater complexity in intergovernmental relations (Kübler & Pagano, 
2012). The impact of globalisation on the nation/region/city relationship has also attracted 
considerable attention  (Brenner, 1998 & 1999; Savitch and Kantor 2002, Newman and Thorn-
ley 2011). In the London case the formation of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 2000 can 
be seen as devolving some central government powers to the city - part of the new Labour Gov-
ernment’s devolution strategy that included the establishment of Assemblies for Scotland and 
Wales.  
A second avenue in the literature has focused on the relationship between the city and its sur-
rounding region. Discussions here have highlighted the inadequacy, as the economic city-region 
expands, of limiting attention to cities within their administrative boundaries (Storper, 1997; 
Scott 2001).  When the functional city-region extends beyond these administrative boundaries 
greater problems of governability are created (Kantor et al, 2012).  Another aspect of this 
city/region relationship, attracting a growing literature, has been the politics of suburban 
sprawl and ‘edge city’ settlements, drawing especially from the US experience (e.g. Phelps & 
Wood 2011; MacLeod & Jones, 2011).  
A third dimension, which is more central to our analysis, has analysed the interaction between 
levels of government within the metropolitan area.  Salet et al (2003) in a coverage of 19 Euro-
pean cities explored the way the coordination of strategic spatial policy was achieved, covering 
local, metropolitan and city-regional levels. City responses ranged from a dominant unitary 
metropolitan government, epitomised by Madrid, through a more common approach in which a 
dual structure operated with collaboration between city and regional levels (sometimes volun-
tary but sometimes within a statutory framework), to a minimalist approach based on particu-
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lar services or projects (see also Lefevre, 1998; Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Salet et al conclude that 
‘the local and meso-level governmental relationships still are the most controversial and com-
plicated relationships in metropolitan governance’ (2003: p 381.). Our focus is on this intergov-
ernmental relationship, in particular that between the metropolitan city and the lower level 
authorities within it. As we have already said, it is our contention that this relationship has un-
dergone a significance shift in London since 2008. The new Mayor, Boris Johnson, has pursued 
an agenda of giving the lower level more autonomy.  However the whole raison d’être of the 
GLA, and the elected Mayor, was to overcome the deficit in strategic vision that had become 
evident since the abolition of the GLC. As we will see this decentralisation agenda has created 
tension and lack of clarity. 
Large cities have a variety of multi-level arrangements and differ in the power available to their 
respective metropolitan mayors. A few characteristics of London government need to be out-
lined from the outset as the city could be regarded as rather a-typical.  In London the issue of 
multi-level governance has been a matter of debate for a long time and predates globalisation. 
Governing the metropolitan area has always been full of political tension.  The best way to gov-
ern a population of over seven million people has rarely gained a consensus of opinion, with the 
questions of the role of the central state, and whether there is a need for a strategic level author-
ity, being particularly contentious. This was highlighted in 1986 when the Thatcher government 
abolished the strategic authority for London – so the capital was without a city-wide elected 
body for the next fourteen years. The UK is sometimes referred to as a ‘dual polity’ (e.g. Lee-
mans, 1970; Bulpitt, 1989).  In contrast to many countries, the UK has a strong central state. 
Then at the lower level, local authorities act as ‘agencies’ of this central state (Stoker, 1991). The 
way this works is that central government passes the laws, sets out the regulations and allocates 
finances from a centralised tax system to specific local authority budget headings. Local authori-
ties have wide responsibilities that include providing the local services that matter to people.  
The local level, with this wide responsibility for local service delivery, is the most immediate 
and recognisable level of government for most residents. Local authorities gain legitimacy from 
this high profile. However local authorities are strongly constrained by the regulations and the 
finances they are allocated by the central state.  Meanwhile the intermediate level of metropoli-
tan government has an uncertain, and often uncomfortable, position within this ‘dual polity’. As 
we have already noted, since 1965 metropolitan London has comprised a lower tier of 32 local 
authorities (London Boroughs) with their directly elected councils.  A basic debate for London 
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has been whether there is a need for a coordinated strategic body, how extensive its remit 
should be, and how democracy should be incorporated. Over the last thirty years there have 
been a number of institutional changes reflecting different ideological positions taken by central 
government on this issue (see for example Travers, 2004). Meanwhile globalisation, and the 
perceived need for London to compete with other cities, has also exerted pressure to reform city 
governance (Newman & Thornley, 2012; Thornley et al. 2005).  
In 2000 central government re-established a strategic authority for London in the form of the 
Greater London Authority, with a directly elected Mayor. This reintroduced the intermediate 
tier into the inter-governmental power game increasing its complexity. As we will see the first 
Mayor – Ken Livingstone – spent most of his energy on his relationship with central government 
and tended to take a rather authoritarian attitude to the local tier. However, as we have already 
said, we believe that there was a sea change in the metropolitan/local power game with the 
arrival of Boris Johnson as Mayor in 2008. In order to demonstrate the novelty of his approach 
we need to establish the nature of governmental relationships over the preceding period in 
more detail  
2.2 The relationship between metropolitan and local government be-
fore Boris. 
When the GLC was abolished in 1986 London was left without an elected metropolitan authori-
ty. Its functions were redistributed to the Boroughs and central government – thus re-asserting 
the dual polity.  The difficult power relationship between elected governments at metropolitan 
and local levels was therefore removed from the equation. However by the early 1990s there 
was increasing concern, led by business organisations, that London government was not 
equipped to play its role in the increasing global competition between cities (Gordon, 1995). 
Stronger leadership and vision was needed to give London a voice in this global competition. 
Central government and business organisations formed new joint bodies to try and fulfil this 
mission (Newman & Thornley, 1997; 2012). When a new national Labour government was 
elected in 1997 a different approach was taken. The Labour Party accepted that the UK and 
London had to respond to the pressures of globalisation but they were also concerned about the 
lack of transparency and democratic involvement in London government. Their response was to 
set up a new metropolitan strategic authority – the GLA - led by a strong directly-elected mayor. 
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Ken Livingstone was elected as the first London Mayor (for details see Travers 2004). He had to 
fight the election as an independent because the Labour Party would not back his candidacy. 
This independence meant that, once in office, he was free to take a strong line in his dealings 
with a Labour central government.  In fact his early years were dominated by his opposition to 
central government policy on the funding of the underground – he went as far as taking the gov-
ernment to Court on the issue.  He also devoted a lot of attention in his first term to lobbying 
government for additional powers. His attention was thus very strongly placed on the relation-
ship between central and city government. He also spent a lot of energy on developing his rela-
tionship with business interests and there was close co-operation in determining the world city 
agenda of the first London Plan in 2004 (Thornley et al. 2005).  
Far less attention was placed upon his relationship with the lower level Boroughs.  He claimed 
that he just did not have the resources and time to develop a close working relationship with all 
32 Boroughs (he suggested that they should be amalgamated into five). The preparation of the 
Mayor’s London Plan, the statutory framework for the Boroughs’ own local plans, did not in-
volve much discussion with the lower-tier authorities. Their main input was confined to making 
representation at the Examination in Public. Thus, rather than developing a close working rela-
tionship with the Boroughs, Livingstone relied on his statutory powers to impose his policies.  
Some of these were strongly disliked by some of the Boroughs – a prime example was housing 
policy. Livingstone had the power to allocate house-building targets to the Boroughs and he also 
formulated a policy that all large new residential developments should contain about 50% per-
centage of ‘affordable’ units. This was to ensure that there was sufficient housing for those in 
social need and for key workers on low incomes, such as nurses, teachers and transport opera-
tors.  A world city relies on such provision. However many Boroughs in outer London opposed 
the idea of having to accommodate such people in their area.   
Thus Livingstone’s policies put much emphasis on improving conditions in the central city with 
facilities needed for its world city role, including improved access (e.g. Cross Rail), congestion 
charging and allowing tall buildings. He also designated ‘opportunity areas ‘ in poor neighbour-
hoods in need of regeneration. His lack of attention to his relationship with the Boroughs, and 
his geographical focus on the centre and areas of poverty provided the setting for Boris’s elec-
tion campaign.  
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3 The 2008 Mayoral Election 
A great deal has been written on the 2008 London mayoral election and the rise of Boris John-
son (see Holman & Thornley, 2011; Gordon & Travers, 2010; Froncoli & Ward, 2008; Johnson, 
2008). Our aim hre is to demonstrate that devolution of authority was a central theme in John-
son’s election campaign and then, via an analysis of voting patterns, illustrate how he benefitted 
from this through increased suburban support.  Through this analysis we will try to unpick how 
and why Johnson sought to transform London’s governing dynamics from one typified by strong 
Mayoral control to one based more on conciliation between tiers1. Later in the analysis of the 
Outer London Commission we will explore the material consequences this had on intergovern-
mental relations in terms of policy (Fairclough, 2003; Robertson, 2007).  
The 2008 campaign saw Johnson issue seven separate political manifestos covering accountabil-
ity, environment, housing, transport, business, crime and senior citizens.  It is our contention 
that these manifestos illustrate Johnson’s aim to create a new governing arrangement between 
the GLA and the lower tier2 (in this case specifically Outer London Boroughs). He did this 
through the constant utilisation of the concept (or ‘identity narrative’) of self-determination. He 
sought to extend further autonomy to the local level and right the perceived wrongs perpetrated 
on the Boroughs by the more autocratic managerial style of Livingstone (for a discussion of this 
regarding sustainability policy see Holman & Thornley, 2011). Self-determination was central to 
all seven of Johnson’s election manifestos.  He pledged to “…create a new style of government at 
City Hall” with”…measures designed to make the Mayoralty more accountable and spending 
more transparent” (Johnson, 2008a: 1).  He also notably promised to work “…with locally-
elected councillors instead of berating them.” (Ibid: 3).  Here, Johnson was careful to point out 
several instances where centre/local relations had been strained under Livingstone.  Using ex-
amples like the 2004 withholding of £1.5 million of the Mayor’s transport funding from Barnet 
Council when they pursued policies contrary to the Mayor’s transport agenda and Livingstone’s 
public rebuke of both Redbridge and Hammersmith & Fulham for attempting to circumvent his 
                                                             
1 This section draws on a wider analysis of the election campaign and the Outer London Commission that 
utilises discourse analysis (Reisigl and Wodak, 2009: Robertson, 2007). This work uses the concept of 
‘identity narrative’ to demonstrate the Mayor’s set of ideational and representational notions. 
2
 Whilst it could be said that Johnson’s conciliatory tone applied equally to inner and outer boroughs, it appears 
that much of this positioning was based on trying to gain electoral advantage in outer London, as many of the 
inner Boroughs were less marginal. 
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affordable housing policy, Johnson painted a picture of an insular, untouchable mayor at odds 
with local officials. To counter this Johnson pledged to usher in “…a new era of cooperation be-
tween London’s Mayor and the borough councils” (Johnson, 2008b: 1) noting that this new rela-
tionship would be strongly based on the idea of localism “…allowing councils the freedom to 
pursue policies that their local residents have elected them to implement” (Johnson, 2008a: 9). 
He also sought to exploit the tensions with London’s electorate that had built up over locally 
unpopular policies like the West London tram and the western extension of the congestion-
charging zone that had been pushed forward by Livingstone despite high levels of local opposi-
tion. Here Johnson again seized on an image of Livingstone as a distant and not altogether be-
nevolent leader who, whilst comfortable with the central focus of London as a world city, was 
hopelessly lost when it came to the more quotidian desires of London residents.   
The impact of this identity narrative was evident in the Mayoral election results (Fig. 2).  Voting 
behaviour in 2008 produced a striking visual image of a blue (i.e. Conservative) outer ring en-
circling a red (i.e. Labour) inner core. Whilst election data for 2000 and 2004 were reported at 
constituency rather than the smaller ward level it is possible to discern that the Conservatives 
were able to make gains in all areas other than in Tower Hamlets.  However, looking at the in-
tensity of the gains in outer London constituencies is revealing.  Johnson made striking gains in 
the Southwest taking Richmond, Kingston and Hounslow, all of which had been originally held 
by Livingstone.  He also won in Greenwich and Croydon, which had also voted for Ken in 2004. 
The following table gives first choice mayoral votes by constituency level for 2004 and 2008 
showing the percentage of the vote gained by Johnson in each instance. It is notable that, whilst 
clearly Johnson did better overall in the election, his seven highest gains (all of which are at 
least three standard deviation points from the mean of 10.09%) are in outer London boroughs. 
INSERT TABLE ONE HERE 
INSERT FIGURE TWO HERE 
As discussed above, the divide between inner and outer London has typically been conceptual-
ised as one between poorer inner city residents and their more wealthy outer suburban neigh-
bours, whilst historically this division bears considerable weight the divide is no longer as rigid, 
as suburban London has diversified its population both in terms of race and class (see Mace, 
2013 and MacLeod & Jones, 2011) and the policies of the urban renaissance have brought more 
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middle class residents back to the centre (see Hamnett & Butler, 2010; Butler et al, 2008).  The 
election results may therefore be illustrative of a rather more nuanced story than one that sees 
a simple switch back to the ‘political norm’ of a Tory suburban fringe challenging an inner core 
of Labour voters.  A different story can be told.  Here the carefully crafted campaign by Johnson 
which sought to establish a new identity narrative of self-determination capitalised on feelings 
of neglect amongst the constituents in outer London, and the clear political tensions between 
the centre (GLA) and the periphery (Outer London Boroughs) noted by outer London council-
lors. This ideational and representational shift helped to create the space for a new type of gov-
erning arrangement in London and reshaped intergovernmental relations. 
3.1 The problem of turning suburban votes into suburban policy: the 
example of the Outer London Commission. 
Having won the election Johnson then sought to use his position to develop policies that would 
benefit his bedrock support in the suburbs. In his manifesto he had made suggestions on how 
transport policy might be changed to benefit the residents of the Outer Boroughs. He also specif-
ically noted how some of outer London’s transport woes could be directly linked to Living-
stone’s focus on transport in central London (Johnson, 2008c: 5).  Recent research has shown 
that suburban areas were starting to experience problems with their local economies and to 
address this Johnson also aimed to better integrate London’s suburbs into the fabric of London’s 
economy.  
Once in office one of the first actions Johnson took to address these policy issues was to set up 
the Outer London Commission (OLC) early in 2009. Its purpose was to advise the mayor on how 
outer London could be better integrated into the London economy and benefit more from the 
city’s economic success.  William McKee, CBE, who has a long history of leadership in the prop-
erty and planning industry in London, chaired the Commission and its membership was drawn 
from the businesses, boroughs, and voluntary sector of outer London and from representatives 
of the development industry. In the trade press it was often framed as the commission that 
would represent the views of the 20 ‘doughnut’ or ‘forgotten’ boroughs of London (Property 
Week, 2009a & 2009b). 
The OLC was specifically charged with the task of understanding how outer London might be 
able to contribute to the economic success of London as a whole; what factors were holding it 
back from doing so; and to make recommendations for it to achieve these aims (OLC website).  
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Here they were to examine the role that quality of life, outer London townscape, local skills, 
transport and funding could have in increasing economic output and integration.  One of the 
most specific spatial policies the OLC was tasked with exploring was the development of four 
large ‘super-hubs’ to be located in the east at Stratford, the west at Heathrow, the north at Brent 
Cross and in the south at Croydon.  As we will see in the analysis this policy proved strongly 
unpopular with the boroughs and was actively challenged. 
In order to undertake this work the Mayor’s office, through the OLC, set up a series of initial 
questions organised around the themes of economic growth, quality of life and transport that 
were designed to give stakeholders a structure for the consultation exercise. The Commission 
then invited written responses and held a series of meetings, which were set up around the four 
sub-regional alliances3 of outer London between March and June of 2009 to give stakeholders 
the opportunity to comment on the questions proposed. Whilst this may have been an efficient 
way to shape the consultation process it might also be viewed as pre-setting the agenda  
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). It could be argued that this moved away from the narrative of self-
determination apparent in the Mayor’s election strategy by imposing a series of pre-formed 
ideas on the stakeholders.  It is in fact notable that one OLC member commented that the ques-
tions posed “…came out of the Mayor’s office and were entirely proscribed” giving even the 
members of the Commission little room for autonomy (Personal communication). 
The following section draws upon a detailed analysis of the written responses to the OLC initial 
questions and the minutes of the four sub-regional meetings described above. Here we will see 
that as the Mayor attempted to reshape his political relationships with the outer London Bor-
oughs by offering greater autonomy and flexibility through self-determination, he was ham-
pered in his ability to set strategic policy that may have offered better spatial integration be-
tween inner and outer London.  This was primarily because the outer boroughs, bolstered by 
the idea of higher levels of self-determination, were resistant to the broader and grander 
schemes for economic integration put forward by the OLC.  The outer boroughs instead saw the 
OLC as a means through which they could lobby the Mayor for more bespoke policies related to 
the specific transport, urban design, housing and education needs of their areas. 
                                                             
3 Sub-regional alliances are partnerships between the public, private and voluntary sectors whose purpose is to 
provide clear strategic leadership and vision to the area covered.  There are four sub-regional partnerships 
that cover outer London, each spanning a number of Boroughs. 
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3.2 Strategic suburban policy meets Self-determination – super-hubs 
and beyond  
When the OLC was set up much was made of the fact that whilst outer London had 60% of Lon-
don’s overall population and 40% of its jobs, employment growth in outer London, in the peri-
ods of 1989-2001 and 2001-2007, had lagged significantly behind both inner London and the 
adjacent counties (GLA, 2009).  In order to reverse this trend the Mayor, through the Commis-
sion, proposed four super-hubs that were to be key to directing growth and regeneration in 
outer London.  The thinking behind super-hubs came from a First Thoughts paper written by the 
Mayor’s office, which helped to set the terms of reference for the OLC.  The paper described the 
need for a “new geography of regeneration” in outer London that would be able to make better 
use of the limited regeneration resources available in the capital by building on areas of success 
(2009 Annex 1 paras 25-26).  These new spaces for growth were therefore seen as a strong stra-
tegic policy designed to better integrate the economy of outer London with the economy of the 
capital as a whole by focusing investment where it was most likely to have an impact.  However 
in order for super-hubs to be successful, given the identity narrative of self-determination 
which called for more autonomy at the borough level, there was a clear need to ensure that the 
boroughs accepted the policy’s rationale.  
In the consultative meetings and in in the responses from stakeholders, the concept of super-
hubs met significant opposition.  The idea was described by the leader of Ealing Council as not 
only inappropriate for west London but as a “recipe for civil war between the boroughs” (OLC 
meeting minutes June 2009).  The strength of feeling against this particular idea of spatial re-
ordering arose from both the sense of concern expressed by those boroughs set to miss out on 
receiving this transfer of funds and infrastructure, and the way in which such an investment 
would integrate the economies of outer and inner London.  There was also considerable evi-
dence that these ‘forgotten’ or ‘doughnut’ boroughs had a quite different agenda and set of con-
cerns, which super-hubs in no way met.   
In the first instance, many boroughs and their sub-regional alliances noted that two of the pro-
posed areas, Stratford and Croydon, were already successful and that providing additional state 
funding to them did not appear to be necessary or equitable. Greenwich argued that injecting 
additional funding to areas “…enjoying the benefits of substantial private investment” appeared 
misguided (LB Greenwich, written response) and the Borough of Bexley commented that super-
hubs would be likely to “…further polarise growth in outer London through the concentration of 
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investment in already successful areas and ignoring of the potential for growth and improve-
ment in smaller centres.” (LB Bexley, written response).  Indeed, several boroughs pointed to 
their own town centres (e.g. Kingston, Canning Town, Barking, Romford or Ilford) all of which 
might suffer if attention and funding was diverted to super-hubs. They saw this as counterpro-
ductive and damaging to the economy of outer London overall.  The boroughs noted that the 
potential super-hubs represented a significant strategic investment from the centre, in terms of 
both funding and infrastructure, and each argued that at least a portion of this investment 
should be spent in their local town centres. 
The second argument against super-hubs linked the idea of investment in existing town centres 
with a different spatial notion for proposed growth.  In this instance the boroughs argued that in 
order for outer London’s economy to grow a series of “super corridors” rather than super-hubs 
should be developed.  As Havering Council explained in their written response, focusing on a 
number of nodes connected via adequate transport would be better at promoting the diversity 
and extent of East London’s economy.  The North London Strategic Alliance and the South Lon-
don Partnership were also vocal supporters of the growth corridor approach, with Ealing Coun-
cil setting out particularly cogent arguments about nodal connectivity based on a super-corridor 
scheme.  Through this initiative a very different spatial pattern of growth was suggested by the 
boroughs, which would not only spread investment more evenly (albeit more thinly) across 
outer London but would also create new transport opportunities. However the development of 
such a growth corridor strategy is constrained by two factors. The spatial areas concerned do 
not relate to specific political entities and rely on voluntary collaboration. Secondly such a strat-
egy would have to incorporate areas beyond the GLA boundary and there is no institutional 
mechanism for this. It is not a strategy that any Mayor will find easy to take on board. 
 Given such high levels of opposition, in the end the idea of super-hubs was dropped as the OLC 
realised that it was highly unlikely that the stakeholders, most especially the boroughs, would 
ever buy-in to the policy (OLC REPORT).When looked at in the round we see a polycentric ap-
proach advocated by both the OLC and the outer London Boroughs.  The difference lies in the 
number and importance of the centres to be supported.  The OLC sought to focus limited funds 
on four core super-hubs as it was felt this would have the best opportunity to positively impact 
on the economy of outer London. Conversely, the boroughs fought for a greater spread of loca-
tions linked together by a more effective transport system and made repeated references to 
their specific local characteristics and circumstances - appealing to the identity narrative of self-
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determination.  What is evident from this example is how the Mayor’s aim of integration was 
defused by the desire of individual boroughs to gain from any potential investment.  We can also 
begin to understand how specific and locally important issues, like increased transport inter-
connectivity, counteracted the idea of a new economic geography of regeneration for outer Lon-
don. 
The final problem with the ill-fated super-hubs, and indeed with the desire to develop a strate-
gic policy to benefit the Outer Boroughs, was that it misread the problem of metropolitan/local 
governmental relations. Looking back to Johnson’s political manifestos we see issues of econo-
my, employment and skills featuring heavily in his policies toward outer London.  There is a real 
sense that efforts should be made to economically integrate the outer and inner boroughs more 
effectively.  However, as we have noted, the language of conciliation also comes through strong-
ly in these manifestos with Johnson promising to allow the boroughs more self-determination 
on policy.  The representations made to the OLC drew heavily on this promise and we would 
argue that in many respects the boroughs saw the OLC as an opportunity to push forward their 
own locally salient issues.  As one OLC commissioner described it, “…there was a mismatch be-
tween Boris and the Boroughs” with Johnson believing that employment was a locally popular 
concern and the boroughs thinking that, for example, more flexible locally controlled parking 
standards were paramount.  In fact, the issue of a more flexible, locally determined, parking 
policy featured in three of the four sub-regional meetings held (the East London meeting being 
the exception) and in numerous responses from the boroughs. 
As we have noted, in the end the concept of super-hubs was jettisoned and the work of the 
Commission lost momentum. However it was reconvened in 2011 to inform the preparation of 
the Mayor’s Supplementary Planning Guidance on Land for Industry and Transport, Housing 
and Town Centres and to advise if alterations to the London Plan were necessary.  In this in-
stance the Mayor asked the OLC to focus on issues like the distribution of a new Outer London 
Fund, more locally flexible commercial and residential parking standards, more flexible housing 
density targets and town centre renewal.  All issues that clearly map better onto the identity 
narrative of self-determination. 
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4 Discussion 
The governance of London is complex – some have even described the city as ungovernable 
(Travers, 2004). A major aspect of this complexity arises from the power relationships between 
national, metropolitan and local governments. There are elections at each level giving them all 
claims to legitimacy. The central government and the boroughs have longstanding positions of 
authority – the London Boroughs have existed in their current form for nearly fifty years. How-
ever the fortunes of the metropolitan level have fluctuated fairly dramatically. This level is not 
consolidated in any written constitution allowing central government to modify its powers, or 
as show in 1986, even abolish it altogether. When the GLA was established in 2000 the Mayor 
was able to establish a new degree of legitimacy for metropolitan government in the capital. 
This was gained from the realisation, based on the experience of the years without a metropoli-
tan government, that this level of government was necessary in the face of inter-city global 
competition. He was also able to draw on a popular mandate for his role through the direct 
Mayoral election, and the fact that in the referendum on whether to establish a London Mayor 
around three quarters of Londoners voted in favour (the figure was much lower in the outer 
Boroughs).  The Mayor is a highly visible figure and able to use his mandate in his power rela-
tionships with other levels of government. As we have seen Livingstone used this in his early 
years to challenge central government. 
However the Mayor is highly constrained. Central government is an important player in the 
government of London as it controls financial allocation. The Mayor also has to abide by the 
legislation set out by central government in the Greater London Authority Act. This sets out cer-
tain responsibilities and requirements for any mayor. These focus on policy co-ordination, sus-
tainability and promoting the city’s economy. This common framework can explain much of the 
continuity between Livingstone and Johnson – such as the promotion of London as a world city. 
So one of the questions that arises is how much scope does an individual Mayor have to set out 
his/her own agenda and exert personal leadership?  In our case this question becomes – how far 
can individual Mayors vary the way they relate to the local level?  The statutory framework 
states that the policies of local authorities have to follow the strategies set out by the Mayor.  
However the Mayor has scope to vary the level of detail in these policies and how far he will go 
to enforce compliance. Livingstone relied on his statutory powers to take a strong role in enforc-
ing his policies on the Boroughs. As we have seen Johnson’ s position was more complex. 
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So, what does the example of the Outer London Commission tell us about broader issues of sub-
urban politics, and the relationship between the strategic and the local? In the first instance it 
sheds light into the difficulties faced by Mayors of large cities like London where the strategic 
tier of government is always in some form of tension with the local.  This is in part due to the 
fact that in large cities there is almost always an inevitable dissonance between the economic 
and social geographies defined by inner and outer areas.  Here mayors are often faced with a 
choice of setting firm strategic direction at the risk of appearing autocratic or being more concil-
iatory at the risk of loosing a guiding vision for their cities.   In the case discussed above, it was 
clear that Johnson saw both electoral and political advantage in moving away from Livingstone’s 
strategic but arguably dogmatic approach.  He extended an olive branch to the boroughs prom-
ising them that, under his leadership, more flexibility would be given in deciding policy.   
However, he also saw a role for a more strategic approach that sought to tie the diverse eco-
nomic geographies of outer and inner London together to create a more cohesive whole and 
provide benefits for declining suburban areas.  To do this required some sort of new spatial con-
figurations to be created in outer London.  This goal necessitated a degree of strategic planning 
and vision that ultimately could not be sustained given the promises of greater levels of local 
self-determination that he gave to the boroughs.  It is in this tension between strategic vision 
and local control where the problems truly lie.  Livingstone placed his emphasis on strategic 
vision that engendered considerable hostility from the local level.  Johnson moved significantly 
towards allowing local autonomy. However he also tried to pursue a form of strategic vision that 
would benefit the suburbs and this recreated tension.  In its latest mode the Outer London 
Commission is moving to a position of confining itself to locally defined policies. This will re-
move the tensions but also any claim to strategic leadership – raising questions over the role of 
the Mayor.  
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Table 1 First choice mayoral votes by constituency Source: London Datastore 
Borough Constituency 
Livingstone 
2004 
Norris 
2004 
Livingstone 
2008 
Johnson 
2008 
% vote 
Cons 
2004 
% vote 
Cons 
2008 
Cons 
Gain 
Standard 
Deviation 
                    
Bexley Bexley and 
Bromley 17,182 23,027  16,832   48,370  57.27 74.18 16.92 3.52 
Havering Havering and 
Redbridge 16,128 24,705  15,066   50,507  60.50 77.02 16.52 3.44 
Richmond upon 
Thames 
South West 
19,560 19,157  19,397   36,439  49.48 65.26 15.78 3.28 
Kingston upon 
Thames 
South West 
13,633 12,983  14,601   26,349  48.78 64.34 15.57 3.24 
Bromley Bexley and 
Bromley 23,801 36,494  23,838   73,682  60.53 75.56 15.03 3.13 
Greenwich Greenwich & 
Lewisham 21,227 11,716  27,651   27,978  35.56 50.29 14.73 3.07 
Hillingdon Ealing and 
Hillingdon 19,702 22,160  21,040   43,617  52.94 67.46 14.52 3.02 
City of London City and East 863 726  1,140   1,708  45.69 59.97 14.28 2.97 
Sutton Croydon and 
Sutton 12,701 16,513  14,326   32,799  56.52 69.60 13.08 2.72 
Wandsworth Merton and 
Wandsworth 30,259 25,227  35,375   48,781  45.47 57.96 12.50 2.60 
Hounslow South West 19,963 13,833  23,940   27,273  40.93 53.25 12.32 2.56 
Southwark Lambeth & 
Southwark 25,099 8,655  39,531   23,737  25.64 37.52 11.88 2.47 
Barking and 
Dagenham 
City and East 
11,918 6,923  16,799   15,710  36.74 48.33 11.58 2.41 
Islington North East 18,582 6,613  29,404   17,658  26.25 37.52 11.27 2.35 
Lewisham Greenwich & 26,623 10,729  35,392   23,173  28.72 39.57 10.84 2.26 
 Lewisham 
Merton Merton and 
Wandsworth 20,923 15,196  25,700   28,762  42.07 52.81 10.74 2.23 
Kensington and 
Chelsea 
West Central 
8,929 16,749  9,430   29,050  65.23 75.49 10.27 2.14 
Ealing Ealing and 
Hillingdon 32,876 20,568  38,880   36,751  38.49 48.59 10.11 2.10 
Croydon Croydon and 
Sutton 30,019 29,504  35,772   52,681  49.57 59.56 9.99 2.08 
Barnet Barnet and 
Camden 29,620 34,730  32,843   57,747  53.97 63.75 9.77 2.03 
Camden Barnet and 
Camden 22,740 11,623  31,069   23,971  33.82 43.55 9.73 2.02 
Lambeth Lambeth & 
Southwark 30,448 11,575  40,641   24,017  27.54 37.14 9.60 2.00 
Hammersmith 
and Fulham 
West Central 
14,592 15,153  19,541   29,807  50.94 60.40 9.46 1.97 
Westminster West Central 15,157 18,340  18,734   32,658  54.75 63.55 8.80 1.83 
Enfield Enfield and 
Haringey 23,424 23,651  30,941   42,526  50.24 57.88 7.64 1.59 
Haringey Enfield and 
Haringey 26,272 9,050  35,742   17,713  25.62 33.14 7.51 1.56 
Harrow Brent and 
Harrow 22,238 21,449  28,070   35,877  49.10 56.10 7.01 1.46 
Waltham Forest North East 20,601 13,160  31,588   25,646  38.98 44.81 5.83 1.21 
Redbridge Havering and 
Redbridge 23,398 22,220  30,849   36,795  48.71 54.40 5.69 1.18 
Hackney North East 21,805 6,642  35,410   14,090  23.35 28.46 5.12 1.06 
Brent Brent and 
Harrow 26,204 15,498  37,792   25,948  37.16 40.71 3.55 0.74 
Newham City and East 22,832 7,697  39,352   14,739  25.21 27.25 2.04 0.42 
Tower Hamlets City and East 16,229 10,157  37,630   17,509  38.49 31.75 -6.74 -1.40 

